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philosophical Theories of Human Nature 
Francis Sparshott 
"What is man, that thou art mindful of him? Or the son of man, that 
thou visitest him?" The questions of the psalmist sound like good 
questions, though the language is unfashionably sexist and they rather 
cake the existence of a mindful deity for granted. But are they really 
good questions? How does one set about answering the q uestion 
"What is humanity?" Can we say in general terms which answers are 
good ones, and what is good about them? Is there some one answer 
that, if we could hit on it, would stand as the one best possible answer 
for all time? And, if there isn't, why isn't there? If there is one set of 
questions that dominates everything philosophers do, this might be 
that set. But philosophers don't actually talk about it much. It is, 
however, what I am going to write about here, though rather incon­
clusively as you will find. 
One caveat I must enter at once. My title is misleading. The word 
"nature" sounds as if I were committed from the beginning to the 
belief that humanity has some timeless essence, corresponding to a 
fixed place in a natural order. But I make no such commitment. I am 
concerned with the possibility of true and adequate answers to the 
question "What is humanity?" whatever the form they may take. The 
concept of nature holds no sway over what follows. I put it in my title 
only to have an excuse for disavowing it at the start. 
A year or two ago I heard two eminent philosophers, whom· I shall 
call che God and the Giant, talking about the prospects of what they 
called "cognitive science." This turned out to mean the project of 
building a computer that would replicate human thought processes. 
One of the philosophers, the Giant, said that what cognitive science 
could do was to work out machine equivalents for particular types of 
intdligent human action, and that by summing these equivalents one 
could approach ever closer to a complete repHcation of human behav­
iour. This perfectly practicable project, he said, was by no means 
invalidated by the fact that one might never succeed in completing the 
replicating machine and could certainly never know that one had done 
so. It seemed to me, as I listened, that the Giant was entirely right 
about this. 
The God disagreed. He said that cognitive science could never make 
any contribution to the understanding of human behaviour, because 
no characterization properly applicable to human behaviour is prop­
erly applicable to anything else. The reason for this, he said, is that 
human action is what it is only because of the context of concern 
within which we do everything we do. Humans always care; machines 
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never do. You can play chess against a computer program. but the 
computer can't play against you because it can't play, can't win or 
lose; the computer program is something you use to help you play 
chess agaiinst yourself. And it seemed to me, as I listened, that the 
God was entirely right, just as the Giant had been. But how could 
both be right, when each was convinced that the other was entirely 
wrong? It was as if there were two incompatible claims about what is 
essentially involved in being a human being, one sticking to observa­
ble behaviour and working up from particular actions and the other 
working down from the general notion of committed intelligent 
agency. It seemed to me that these might be two aspects of our notion 
of humanity, each necessary even if not jointly sufficient. But, if that 
is so, why were the God and the Giant so fiercely at odds? I found it 
very puzzling. 
The God said something else, that I didn't think was right. He said 
that the committed concern and care of a human being could be 
embodied only in organic matter, in flesh and bone and such sruff ­
and not, presumably, in wires and chips. But he didn't say why that 
had to be true. He said that if you found between your best friend's 
shoulderblades a trapdoor with a mess of gears and circuitry inside 
where the liver and li:ghts should be, your best friend wouldn't be 
your friend any more. I agree that it wouldn't happen and won't 
happen and couldn't happen, but if it did happen it could happen and 
would probably keep happening, and why not? I am glad to say that I 
don't actually know that any of my friends have real meat inside - I 
have never looked, and I have never asked them. What would I think 
if one of them proved to be metallic after all? Would my friend stop 
being my friend? Perhaps I would decide that my friend was a person, 
and a very nice person, even if not exactly a human person - but 
surely not exactly inhuman either. In any case, the God is clever and 
famous, so here we have a third possible view of what is essential to 
humanity to be an intelligent manifestation of ensouled embodiment 
in a biological order. 
Anyway, here were at least two views about what humanity essen­
tially is, both of which a conscientious philosopher should take into 
account. How many such views are there, and how do we identify 
them? Then I recalled that, many years ago, my department set up a 
course in "theories of man" or some such, and told me to teach it, so 
I had to figure out what to teach. What did I do? I don't remember, 
but I expect we read a little Plato, a little Aristotle, a little Descartes, a 
little Lockeberkeleyhume, a little Nietzsche, a little Heidegger or Sar­
tre, stuff like that. It was quite easy, in practice, once one realized that 
the prior question was, "What texts are available in paperback?" It 
was not so easy to say what such a course should ideally contain and 
how it should be organized. Absolutely everything anyone is and does 
is equally an aspect of humanity, so how could there possibly be a 
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theory of it all? The mind boggles. 
Faced by such boggling of the mind, some philosopheirs say that 
one must be dealing with a pseudo-question. Real questions, they say, 
have real answe·rs, because they arise from real uncertainties in spe­
cific contexts. Whatever has no straightforward answer cannot be a 
real question. But all sorts of answers have been given to the question 
"What is humanity?" The problem is how the answers are to be eval­
uated. I have never understood exactly what a pseudo-question is, but 
I don't see how calling something a pseudo-question solves anything. 
It is an inadequate excuse for not thinking about complex and ill­
formulated issues. We still have to decide what the issues are and 
what to do about them. 
Philosophically, the question "What is a human being?. , seems to 
arise as soon as one embarks on that respectable philosophical disci­
pline, ethics or moral philosophy. Questions of the form "What shall 
I do?" and 11How shall I live my life?" are completely general in scope, 
in the sense that all my values and concerns are in prindple brought 
to bear on every decision I make, and all the values and concerns cur­
rent in a community are brought to bear on every issue of policy it 
faces, in the sense that the limited frameworks and contexts within 
which each decision is made hold their validity only on the assump­
tion that there its no other framework and context that should 
preempt them. In practice, of course, we don't always call everything 
into question, and the Socratic claim that only an examined life is 
rruly human is one we need not grant, but the principle holds. That 
means that ethical reflection drives us to inquire into what kinds of 
constraints and determinants govern and should govern our actions 
and plans overall. Since the ancient Greeks, the rationale of living has 
not often been pursued at this level, where one inquires into the rela­
tion between goodness, justice, convenience, advantage, pleasure, 
righteousness , beauty, sweetness, cchuman flourishing, ,  and so forth, 
and even the Greeks never examined the question in a really critical 
spirit. But it seems to me that the question "'How should I live?" takes 
that sort of form, and is in a shadowy sort of way coterminous with 
the question ccwhat am I?" And the question "What am I?" looks as 
if it might be the subjective and existential form of the question 
"What is a human being?,,, though it would be rash to affirm that it 
actually is the same. 
Meanwhile, on the purely practical level, there was this course in 
the university calendar 1 and the course had to be taught. By me. 
The course, as I have described it, was merely anecdotal. I pres­
ented and discussed views that happened to have becom.e standard, 
over the course· of years, to the point where the documents were eas­
ily available and came easily to a mind that had been submitted to a 
conventional academic education. Now, that may really be the best 
way to do things: what has become a traditional consensus suffices to 
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define the standpoint of modern civilization, and iro have done any­
thing more systematic would have been merely to rely on one subjec­
tive interpretation of that consensus among others. We may, of 
course, wonder how the consensus was reached , and what it was a 
consensus about. To say that these are the leading available alrernative 
views does not explain what it is they lead in, or whether they are 
truly alternatives to each other; and availability is not always a virtue. 
But there may after all be no answer to such questions: the content of 
a curriculum, like other administrative institutions, is a concrete uni­
versal that may resist analysis. All the same, we can't be sure before­
hand that there is nothing more to be said. 
One possible interpretation of the sort of course I taught is that it 
consisted, in effect, of attempted solutions to the mind-body prob­
lem. But does that mean that I, and the philosophers on whom I 
depended, had surreptitiously stipulated that the human being is 
essentially that being in relation to which, and for whom, the mind­
body problem arises? If so, how was that stipulation validated? It 
seems only too likely, when we think about it, that philosophers have 
agreed among themselves on making that stipulation, because, as phi­
losophers, minds are what interest them and bodies are what they 
have to have. If so, my casual reliance on book catalogues may have 
been sinister rather than benign. What is in paperback is popular 
prejudice. 
If philosophers put the question about humanity in a special way, it 
is because that is the way in which the question becomes salient for 
them. If we are going to escape that sort of bias, then, we will have to 
pose the following general question: i n  what sorts of context is it the 
question uwhat is a human being?" that becomes salient, as opposed 
to questions about sexes, trades, ages, natures, or cross--categorizations 
that only some humans share with some beings that are not human? If 
the question becomes salient only in some special contexts, one may 
be quite wrong even to raise the question in other contexts; if, on the 
other hand, it is a question that can in principle always be raised, it 
might still call for different answers in different contexts in which it 
does become salient. 
What sorts of answers to the question ccwhat is a human being?" 
become salient when? I would expect answers to become salient, irres .. 
pective of immediate practical occasions and concerns, on two condi­
tions. The first condition is that there should exist preemptive sys­
tems of explanation within which our civilization provides and 
structures answers to such questions. The second condition is that 
some answers to the question should prove inexpugnable. The first 
condition is fulfilled by whatever the currently accepted system of 
basic science may be; the second condition is fulfilled in the way Des­
cartes made famous,, by considering the most basic acceptable answers 
that could be given by human beings when they reflect on their own 
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humanity and ask themselves "What am I?" l will say something of 
each of these in turn. 
The preemptive systems of explanation in our civilization are those 
of accepted or mainstream science. The whole point of these scientific 
systems is that they are preemptive: they are built up critically to elim­
inate error and illusion, and hence to resist disbelief. The scope of 
science, most people agree. is limited; but these limitations do not 
undermine its authority. 
Science, in fact, provides not one preemptive system, but three. 
The first is that of physics (which I am taking here to include chemis­
try). The precise content and scope of contemporary physics is not 
what matters here: what matters is its status as our basic science, to 
which, if to any, all other natural sciences must be reduced. Physics is 
the science of nature just insofar as it is natural. Well, a human being 
is, whatever else it is, a natural object; human beings are among the 
sorts of entity that physical science applies to, a special but not-too­
special case of that of which the laws of physics hold. Ph ysics can and 
must reach an answer to the question "What is a human being?" by 
systematically differentiating humans from other natural entities, and 
whatever answer it reaches will have an unshakable privilege. The 
physics and chemistry of humans are essential to humanity if human­
ity is a reality in the natural world. 
It is important to realize. however, that the very fact that physics as 
her-e understood is the general science of nature as a whole and in 
general makes it unlikely that it will shed light on any specific ques­
tions about humanity as such. What we can truthfully say in its terms 
will be important and will have its privileged place, but it will proba .. 
bly not be what we want to know. It might have been incumbent on 
our physics to tell us what we most want to know about humanity if 
it had been the, only preemptive system of explanation our civilization 
had at its disposal. But there are at least two others, and that lets 
physics off the hook. 
The second preemptive system is that of biology and zoology. The 
concept of physics as basic science is a bit cloudy, but humans are 
quite clearly and directly beings of the kind that biology is about. In 
fact, it is plausible to claim that biology was originally generated by 
extrapolation and extension from an inquiry into human nature as a 
kind of nature: you can see this happening already in Aristotle, who 
really invented the idea of biology. Man is a kind of animal, but the 
concept of an animal is itself arrived at by generating and refining 
analogies between humans and other entities; humanity is at the con­
ceptual centre here, whereas among the entities with which physics 
deals humanity has no privilege. It follows, oddly enough,  that the 
proviso that humanity must figure within these explanatory systems as 
a case that, though special, is not too special, is less evidently stringent 
for biology than for physics. A human must be plausibly a physical 
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object, or the claim of physics to be the one basic science cannot be 
allowed; but a human need not be a plausible biological object. Since 
biology i5 or mjght be an expansion of the study of humanity, not 
necessarily making any claims to foundational status among the scien­
ces, biology could be based on extrapolating from what is admi ttedly 
only a part of human reality. Human beings could be other things as 
well, without biology having to be concerned at all. 
The recent development of sociobiology suggests that uneasy status 
of biology in this regard. It is possible to equate biology as far as pos­
sible with genetics, in that it is at the molecular level that biology 
comes closest to being a specialist department of physics. Sociobiol­
ogy in its application to human behavior can then be seen as a specu­
lation on the extent to which human experience can be explained in 
terms of survival value. Those who work in this field may then be 
puzzled when their work is felt to be threatening. Why should it be? 
Nothing they do need claim to displace other means of access we have 
to our lives. The preemptive claims of our main systems of explana­
tion need not amount to usurpations. 
The third preemptive system of explanation is very different from 
the other two. It is the sum of the human sciences. In this system, the 
assertion or denial that humanity has some exceptional status among 
the realities of the world is simply irrelevant. Humanity now becomes 
coextensive with economics, plus sociology, plus anthropology of 
course, plus human psychology. The simple sum of reliable answers 
to specific questions in the context of accepted scientific methodol­
ogy, however that may (for the time being) be conceived and however 
its domains may be organized, provided that the questions are clearly 
and straightforwardly about humans and not about other sorts of 
entity, furnishes the acceptable straight answer to the question "What 
is humanity?" The philosophy of human nature would be the critique 
of such science from the point of view of its summability, adequacy, 
completeness, consistency, depth and so on. And the philosophy of 
human nature overall would be the same sort of critique of all three of 
the putatively preemptive systems of explanation. 
In sum, then, the answers to the question "What is humanity?" that 
are provided by these three systems of scientific explanation, together 
with the corresponding philosophical critiques, are an essential part of 
any account of what humanity is that can be taken seriously. But they 
are not the whole of it, because, as I said before, there are inexpugna­
ble answers to the question "What is humanity?" that arise quite 
independently of any general explanatory systems., and cannot be pre­
sumed a priori to be equivalent to what those systems require or even 
to be reconcilable with them. 
The second set of permanently salient answers to the question 
11What is humanity?", the ones I call "inexpugnable," are the answers 
that no context of inquiry can invalidate. And the reason no context 
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can invalidate the particular answers I have in mind is that they are· 
involved in the very act of asking and answering the question. The 
basic idea is that of Descartes: whatever I am, I cannot deny that I am 
a being that can wonder what it is; I cannot deny my own denial, I am 
at least a thinking being. No systematic framework of explanation is 
appealed to here, only the minimum that is built into the act of asking 
and answering. Our present enterprise, however, differs from that of 
Descartes in at least one important way. We are not trying to combat 
metaphysical scepticism; we are asking about ourselves as human 
beings, as a kind of entity that is admitted to be real in a real world. 
We may then discover not, as Descartes did, a single inexpugnable 
answer, but as many as our self-comprehension requires. At least nine 
are familiar to philosophers. I will say what these are and explain 
them as succinctly as I can. 
1 .  First, what must I be to be able to ask and answer this ques­
tion or any other? Jean-Paul Sartre gave a twofold answer: I 
must be, first, a hare consciousness, a nothingness, able to 
distance itself from and to call into question any concrete 
self-identification whatever; I must also be, second, a real 
being, a self-conscious entity with enough identity and conti­
nuity to ask and answer questions, a being-for-·itself. 
2 .  Second, what must I be to be able to formulate this question 
or any other? I must have a language with a definite structure 
and use. So I must be a symbol-user, a language-user; more 
generally, I must be a culture-haver and an information­
processor. This second answer comes from Aristotle. 
3 .  Third, what must I be actually to set about asking and trying 
to answer this question? Any being that conducts inquiries is 
a being that forms plans and seeks to execute them, an auto­
nomous agent. This third answer sounds rather like Imma­
nuel Kant. 
4. Fourth, what must I be to want to ask the question? As in the 
quotation with which I began this talk, questions like "What 
am I?" and "What is man?" come close to being cries of des­
pair. A being that calls its own being in question is a being 
with no security; Descartes' answer, "I am a thinking sub­
stance," is the coldest of comfort unless we can collapse 
almost at once into the arms of an almighty God. A being 
that can seriously ask such a question is, as Albert Camus 
said, an "absurd" being, one that cannot fit anywhere into 
any system of categories even if it is itself the author of those 
categories. Camus' answer is one not much favoured by phi­
losophers, who conclude that Camus was better at football 
than at philosophy; but it is an important member of our set 
of inexpugnable answers, for all that. 
5 .  The fifth member of the set is unfinished business from the 
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first member, the one derived from Sartre. What must l be to 
be able to ask the question in just the way that I do ask it� I 
must be not just a rational animal. but the very kind of 
animal I was born as and grew up to be, not just a speaker of 
language but a speaker of the very language I learned to speak 
at home. To be human I must be a particular biological entity 
and a particular social entity, with a sharply individuated 
body and mind. 
6. Once a person gets used to those first five of our inexpugna� 
ble answers, they are quite simple and obvious. What we 
come to next is more recondite. Our sixth answer comes 
from combining the fifth one, about our biological and social 
situatedness, with the first one about nothingness or the 
fourth one about absurdity. What am I or who am I, we now 
ask, that I should thus call the world and my own self into 
question, knowing all the time that it is a real world in which 
I really live? The answer must be that I am the fragile sus­
tainer of the world; I am what Heidegger called Dasein, the 
place where being is revealed, the questioning that makes all 
answers possible. That is fancy stuff; the basic form of the 
answer here would simply echo the precise form of our ques­
tion in the way we asked it. That is:I am the being for whom 
the world is real, but only because I call its reality into 
question. 
7 .  Our seventh answer may be no more than a different version 
of the sixth one, but we can reach it directly by recalling what 
the "God" urged in the philosophical battle between the God 
and the Giant that I mentioned several pag.es back. I am ask­
ing about humanity because I care about myself and my 
world. To be human is to be concerned, to be responsible, to 
be interested; our lives are essentially a structure of care, and 
to cease to care is to fall out of humanity. 
8. The eighth answer is reached by cutting out the melodrama 
fr.om the seventh. The world really does not depend on us, 
when I die the world will go on as it did before I was born. 
To ask, not j ust one of the forms of question about oneself 
and one's humanity that I have formulated, but all of them, I 
must be living in a caringly and responsibly embedded way 
within a world whose complexities the complications of my 
self-questioning reflect. That is the world of Hegel's philo­
sophy, in which human individuality is reached by a long dia­
lectical process of ever deepening relationships; it is also the 
world of the great religions, in which, as Martin Buber said, 
"the world is established, as we ourselves" - but just how it 
is established it is not so easy to say. 
9. Whoever says Hegel must say Kierkegaard, even if one mut-
9
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ters it under one's breath, and may even be moved to say 
NietT..sche as well. We have allowed the question "What is 
humanity?" to become the question "Who am l?" - because 
after all. as we said when introducing our fourth answer, we 
want to ask the question only because it concerns us. As a 
human being, l represent that kind of being that sets itself up 
as an individual against the world to which it belongs but 
whose insidious possessiveness it repudiates. Not merely an 
autonomous agent, as our third answer made out, but a being 
that fundamentally asserts itself and the system of its own 
concerns, in fear and trembling or in defiance. 
That gives us nine inexpugnable answers, and l think that's enough 
for today. Why should humanity have more lives than a cat? In any 
case, as we went on from one of our answers to another, the path 
became ever more tangled. It may be time to ask ourselves whether 
there really is a path at all. As we suspected on a previous occasion, in 
connection with the mind/body problem, what seemed to give our 
answers authority may have been a bias built into the questions. 
When Descartes in his quest for indubitability asked what must be 
involved in the very act of questioning, his procedure was legitimate 
because asking questions really was what he was talking about. But I 
have been carrying on as if we somehow knew that asking and answer­
ing questions was not only essential to humanity, but as it were con­
stitutive of humanity. But is it? We can see the problem as soon as we 
ask whether it is not equally true that humanity is essentially a sexual 
being. To be a mammal, to be any sort of well organized animal, is to 
have a sex, and this sexuality affects deeply how we structure our 
lives. And if Freud is right, human lives are more pervasively sexual 
than the lives of any other animals. But is chis sexuality something 
chat is essential to our humanity, or is it just an important but ines­
sential aspect of it? I do not know. More important, if I thought I did 
know, it would not be because of anything I have said so far. The pre­
supposition that humans are first and foremost questioning beings, a 
presupposition I did not even know I was making, gave me a false 
sense of security. Suddenly I feel helpless. 
Why? you may ask. Wasn't Descartes right? Does not our status as 
questioning beings have an inexpugnability that nothing else can pos, 
sibly have? Well, yes and no. Some feminists suggest that the primacy 
of questioning, with its insinuation of the primacy of the mind over 
che body, of the individual over the group, and of the explicit over the 
implicit, is simply an expression of typically male sensibility, and 
would have won no credence if enough women had been allowed into 
the philosophical enclave soon enough. That is what makes the ques, 
tion of the essential sexuaUty of human nature one that we cannot sys­
tematically postpone to the sorts of inexpugnable consideration we 
enumerated. As a male, trained in a male philosophy, I am in no posi� 
10
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tion to pontificate {besides, since only males can be pontiffs, pontifi­
cating would have no effect). 
Actually, things are worse than that. Because l took uncritically the 
standpoint of some human being aslcing 0Who or what am l?",  I lazily 
took it for granted that the answer to that question would automati­
cally answer the question "What is a human being?" But of course 
that is not true. What it automatically answers, if anything, is more 
likely to be some such question as "What is a person?" Most of my 
preferred answers might have been given by any self-questioning life­
(orm, whether it was a human being or not - remember what the 
God said on the necessity that persons should be made of meat. Per­
haps this whole discourse depends on our being ready to admit that as 
philosophical inquirers, which is what all of us are while we are read­
ing philosophy and thinking about what we read, we are first and 
foremost human beings. And why should we admit that, and what are 
we letting ourselves in for if we do? 
Like someone who, while nonchalantly doing up a zipper, suddenly 
notices that the part which the tag should have closed still gapes as 
widely as the part it has yet to travel, we find ourselves in a predica­
ment to which there is no immediate solution. But we can't do any­
thing about that now, so let us proceed. Before our doubts crippled 
us, we were trying to draw up a list of answers to the question "What 
is humanity?" that no one could deny were good answers. Perhaps we 
know less than we thought we did about what should be on that list, 
but we can still say something about how an answer could be eligible 
for it. Each answer must be inexpugnable, such that a denial of its 
relevanc:e and truthfulness would be silly. The answers, if it is to be a 
proper list, must be mutually irreducible, so that none could be omit­
ted; and they must resist mutual subordination, so that none could be 
directly inferred from any other. That gives us something to go on. 
And I would now add that each acceptable answer must claim pre­
emptive salience, must be such that in some important context it 
would be the first thing that came to mind and would be such that 
one could rest content with it. 
Pre-emptive salience may be conferred by a system of overall expla­
nation such as the sciences provide, or by inexpugnability in a context 
of inquiry. It can also be conferred by inherent poignancy in terms of 
some pervasive preoccupation of the dominant culture. Such poig­
nancy belongs to traditional contrasts of soul and body, of spirit and 
flesh, of freedom and law, the compelling force of which seems to 
come from something other and deeper than any arguments used to 
explicate and vindicate them. But something else also seems to confer 
pre-emptive salience: not sciences, bll!t myths, world pictures or world 
narratives within which humanity must be assigned a place. Perhaps a 
well-supported answer to the question "What is humanity?" is most 
often one that fits into such a picture or story, a persuasive scenario. I 
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can think of half a dozen types of such scenario. They overlap with 
our scientific systems and our inexpugnable answers, as we would 
expect. but they don't coincide with either. Space is too short for 
decails; here are some thumbnail sketches to give you an idea of the 
sort of thing I have in mind. 
1 .  The first scenario starts with a ubig bang" and proceeds via 
the formation of galaxies, of stars, of planets, of big mole­
cules, of cells, of multicellular organisms, to the development 
of planning and questioning life forms in an ecosystem, which 
is where we are now, and onward who knows where if any­
where. In this scenario, humanity may figure as a particular 
manifestation in the history of the "selfish gene" or some­
thing like that. 
2. The second scenario envisions a single terrestrial ecosystem. 
"spaceship earth" in Buckminster Fuller's old phrase, in 
which human cities coexist with termiteries and coral colonies 
as more or less stable systems, but in which conscious delib­
eration and reflection introduce a uniquely complicating fac­
tor into the closed loop of ecological feedback. That compli­
cation is what we know as humanity. 
3. In the third scenario, some demiurge establishes a special 
community or species, humanity or the tribe, together with 
its own folkways and laws with which it ought to comply but 
'doesn't always. Humanity is defined by a special vital relation 
to the demiurge, such as that expressed by St. Augustine in 
the sentence Fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec 
requiescac in te -"Thous hast made us for thyself, and our 
heart is restless until it rest in thee." In the most familiar ver­
sion of this scenario, as Augustine's words remind us, a 
human being is first and foremost a spiriritual being. 
4. The fourth scenario starts with an infant born blind and 
dumb that grows to find itself a member of a family, an inti­
mate intercourse group, through which it grows up to realize 
its membership in successively larger and larger circles of 
interrelaters and language sharers, remaining sustained in a 
huge and intricate web of relationships that are the meaning 
of its life. In this scenario, the story of a lifetime is the only 
story that matters, and humanity is the maximal scope of the 
circles into which birth affords entry. 
5. The fifth is parallel to the fourth as the third was parallel to 
the first. In this scenario, the unknowing infant acquires con­
sciousness, becomes conscious of itself as an entity, then of 
itself as an individual person, then of itself as a free, auto­
nomous agent, able to enter spontaneously into contractual 
relationships with other free individuals. Humanity in this 
scenario is the maximal market in which all are strangers. 
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6. ln the sixth scenario we stare with ourselves as reflective 
adults and analyse the srrucrure of our freedom and under­
standing. The scenario is the corresponding synthesis. In the 
mythical time of absolute origins the individual is a pure sub.. 
ject for whom there are objects. It finds itself thrown into a 
world to which it somehow belongs without losing its 
thrownness. All the other scenarios are good stories and you 
have to believe them. but you can't be contained in them 
because they are just part of your belief. The universe is a sys. 
tern and you are obviously part of the system, so you identify 
yourself with the world, but the identification is something 
you do a.s an isolated subjectivity. In this scenario, humanity 
is defined by the duty and capacity of exploring this 
predicament. 
There you have six popular scenarios .. They don't contradict each 
other, unless you make it part of each story that it is the only true 
story that can be told. What makes such a scenario, such a picture or 
such a story, persuasive or convincing? Presumably, in the first 
instance, it would be conformity to an accepted narrative or represen­
tational mode; and one could hardly spell out what makes such a 
mcxie acceptable, since whatever really did not conform to it would 
not be a bad or unconvincing representation so much as something 
that did not really say or show anything at all. But that is only in the 
first instance. There must be more to it than that: not all conceivable 
narrative and pictorial modes are viable in all societies, I expect, and 
some stories and pictures that do comply with the approved modes 
will prove less acceptable than others. Actually, when I look at my six 
examples, I notice that in each of them a picture of a world, or of a 
part of a world, has been built up either by a sort of evolutionary 
development from a supposed original simplicity, or by imagining 
myself zeroing in from a global view. These are familiar patterns 
indeed. I used them quite unselfconsciously. But, even if the fact that 
they come naturally gives them a kind of privilege, 1 know of no justi­
fication for that privilege. In fact, I have no system of justification at 
all in this area. I know of no rules; so far as I am aware, the selection 
and construction of such scripts and panoramas are as arbitrary and 
ad hoc as the answers to the more naive;looking questions I was asking 
at the beginning:"Which philosopher has a good theory about human­
ity?" and "What kind o( practical preoccupation points to an inescap­'able and fundamental aspect of our being?" 
When I am feeling low, the way all these leads keep fizzling out per­
suades that, after all these words, I really don't know at all what shape 
a good general answer to the question "What is humanity?" should 
have, what kind and degree of consistency among putative or partial 
answers should be looked for, and above all whether the task of com­
piling such an answer, or even the task of saying what conditions such 
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an answer should comply with, is in principle completable. And I cer­
tainly don't know what place the question should have in general phi­
lasophy. whether the philosophy of human nature should replace 
ethics and metaphysics, for example. or be dissolved into them, or 
stand in some inviting posture alongside them. It would be nice to 
think that it was only a pseudo-question after all. 
That's how I feel on my bad days. But I do have my good days, and 
then I feel like saying that, after all, the bathwater of discourse I have 
been emptying out here was not entirely free from babies. 
We have, in fact, furnished ourselves with a serviceable sketch of 
what a general philosophical answer to the question "What is human­
icy?" could be like. It might be the completion, the adequate formula­
tion , the interrelation, and the justification of the list of lists I have 
built my discourse around: preemptive systems of explanation, inex­
pugnable answers, and scenarios. If so, it would also be the comple­
tion and interrelation of the lists themselves. Alternatively, it would 
be a justified explanation of exactly why those tasks cannot be per­
formed. In either case, people attempting the answer might conceive 
themselves as doing so either within a specific context of inquiry of 
which the validity was either independently established or called in 
question, or for the present age, or for all time. The fact that we do 
not ourselves have any prospect of performing any of these tasks, and 
that I for one have no intention of trying, does not affect the fact that 
we have a far from empty framework within which the problem can 
be considered. 
The first time I presented these thoughts to an audience, however, I 
was confronted with a number of challenges. Most of these , as usually 
happens on these occasions, were protests by hobbyhorse riders who 
complained that I had not confined myself to the only real truth of 
the matter, which happened to be the sole aspect of the issue they had 
thought about. iBut two of the challenges are worth a mention, claim­
ing to offer approaches that differed from mine and ruled it out of 
court. They could be right, and you might agree, so I had better say 
what they were. 
One challenger said that my approach was ahistorical, whereas in 
reality humanity is nothing but the history of humanity. In a way 
that's quite right, I think: to say what humanity is, you say what 
humans have done and do. But the question then arises what you put 
in your history, and why you put it in, and the principles of your his­
toriography are then what serves as your answer to the question what 
humanity is. I won't pursue that debated topic any further here, 
beyond saying that it is not clear what difference it would make if we 
took our starting point from history, but since it isn't clear we must 
leave the matter open. However, there are two specific versions of the 
equation of humanity with its history that I would single out. First, if 
we follow some contemporary biologists and say that animal species 
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are not really natural kinds, because of the way the gene pool changes, 
but are individuals, then you could certainly say that humanity is such 
a genetically constituted individual and is defined by its life-story . But 
we dealt with that. It is taken care of by the preemptive status of biol­
ogy and is incorporated in the scenario that starts with the big bang. 
Second, people who want to equate humanity with its history are 
often talking about the Hegelian view of history (including its Marxist 
variants) in which everything human is excluded as unhistorical 
except what contributes to some desired consummation in a presum­
ably perfect moment of past or future. About that sort of thing I have 
nothing to say except that such a scenario requires justification like 
any other; and the justification had better be good, because what is 
excluded as unhistorical and hence beneath consideration is usually 
rather a lot. 
If, however, we equate humanity with its history but think of his­
tory as chronicle rather than narrative, we may arrive at a quite differ­
ent way of answering the question "What is humanity"? That is what 
I had in mind when I said that "To say what humanity is, you have to 
say what humans have done and do." We can say, as Democritus is 
said to have said, "Humanity is - what we all know." We simply 
point to all the people there are and say "Look!" It turns out, though, 
thjlt there are rather too many to point at. So we choose examples: 
ideals that show what we are to aspire to, monsters that show what we 
must dread. 
Democritus was a philosopher in good standing, but the rest of the 
philosophical community have qualms. How do we decide how to 
choose our ideals and monsters, they say, and how shall we distin­
guish what in them is to be avoided and dreaded? Pointing is useless 
unless we know what is being pointed at, showing us an example is 
impossible unless we can see what it is an example of. And that is 
quite true. But it is also true that a human being is someone who lives 
a life, and a life is a whole life, and cannot be reduced to episodes and 
aspects. If philosophical answers to the question "What is humanity?" 
are given in words, they will all be fundamentally misleading unless 
they are counterpoised by the weight of experience. Humanity is what 
we all know, and is all of what we know, and whatever philosophers 
have to tell us should end by reminding us of that. 
So much for the challenge of history. The second challenge to my 
approach told me I had started by dealing with the wrong question: 
the existential form of the question "What is humanity?" should have 
been put in the form, not "What am l?" but " Who am l?" And I am 
certainly ready to agree that, when we are examining as I said we must 
the relation between the questions "What is humanity?" and "What 
am l?" this further question must be included too. Probably all three 
questions change their meanings from context, but not necessa ,rily in 
simple or uniform ways. 
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Just because a question so impersonal as "What is a human being�" 
seems to belong to the domain of preemptive explanatory schemes, 
an\' attempt to answer it raises poignantly the question "What, then. 
am E Is that all I am!" And because the question "What am I?" calls 
immediately for an answer that is self-evidently inexpugnable, any 
answer to it provokes the more reflective supplementary question? " ls 
this, that I evidently am, really what a human being essentially is?" 
But it seems to me that the question "Who am I?" stands rather on its 
own. We notice, for one thing, that one cannot sensibly ask "Who is 
a human being?" or "Who is man!", much less "Who is humanity?" 
More importantly, perhaps, "Who am I?" seems to be a quite differ­
ent sort of question from the others. If I ask t4·ho I am I imply that I 
know I am someone, a person; I am asking only which among all rea.1 
or possible persons is me. One can hardly imagine anyone asking the 
question except in amnesia. The question can only arise, of course, in 
languages that make this distinction between u•ho and u·hac; but per­
haps all languages do, and, if they don't, perhaps they should. 
Curiously enough, the personal-sounding question uwho am I?" 
may be reifying in a tendentious way that neither "What is a human 
being?" nor CfWhat am I?" is. Asking who I am asks what person I 
am, and a person is surely a substance, distinguished from other per­
sons in the way that a substance is distinguished from other substan­
c:es. But the pronoun "What" can be used of entities in any category. 
And if the being I am is the living that I do, perhaps I should not 
think of myself, in the first instance, as a substance at all. 
Even if I have beaten off those challengers, they may rearm and 
return to the assault; and I do not know what fresh challenges might 
be issued - have perhaps been issued out of my hearing, and the 
issue decided in their favor. The misgivings of my bad days are exac­
erbated by the sense of approaches neglected, roads not taken, 
thoughts unheard of. But 1 would remind you that what we are left 
with is, after all, not nothing. We have three schemes of explanation, 
nine inexpugnab�e answers, and six scenarios to refine, combine, cri­
ticize, and add to. It is hard to believe, whatever our misgivings, that 
we are right back where we started. So the question "What is a 
human being?" does not leave us speechless. But there really need be 
no one way of answering it. In its traditional form, "What is man?", it 
usually expressed some anxiety about the status of those who asked it: 
for the Greeks, it was the status of humanity vis-a-vis divinity; for the 
post-Darwinians, the human place among other animals; today, the 
difference between humanity and machinery. If that is so, then per­
haps cchuman" is primarily a contrastive term, and its precise signifi­
cance in any context would depend on what it was being contrasted 
with. The unity of the concept through all these contrasts would be 
what we would have to trace; but the importance of the contrast 
would in each ,case be different. 
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But that, too, is something a philosopher would have to discuss. I 
really do not see how a philosopher can turn away from these ques� 
tions. We will go on wondering what humanity is, unless we are to 
give up philosophy altogether. 
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